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Piracy and Gray Markets
by ROBERT W. STEELE*
Introduction
During the past 25 years, I have been involved in both trade-
mark and antitrust litigation, particularly with emphasis on
cases where restraints on distribution and pricing have arisen
from the purported enforcement of trademark rights.
This has been a controversial and rapidly-evolving area of the
law during the past ten years. In fact, probably no greater area
of controversy has arisen in trademark law within this time pe-
riod than that of the parallel imports or gray market cases.
"Gray Market goods" or parallel imports are goods which are
bought abroad and sold in the United States for less than the
usual price. If an importer can purchase Duracell batteries, for
example, for significantly less in Singapore than in the United
States, he can ship the batteries back to the United States and
resell them here, undercutting the domestic price, and still
make a profit. The D.C. Circuit defined parallel imports as:
[G]oods manufactured abroad bearing legitimate foreign trade-
marks that are identical to American trademarks. This situa-
tion typically arises when a foreign producer creates an
American subsidiary that then registers the American
trademark.1
Parallel import cases do not present the issues that normally
arise in a Lanham Act trademark or unfair competition case.
The typical Lanham Act case arises when a trademark owner
seeks to stop the sale of another's product as his own.2 For a
few reasons, parallel import cases are very different.
First, parallel imports do not involve the pirating of trade-
* Mr. Steele is a founding partner of Steele & Fornaciari in Washington, D.C.
The author argued on behalf of private petitioner K Mart in the Supreme Court case
of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of his partner Robert E. Hebda in the preparation of these
remarks.
1. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1987). Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
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marks.3 The trademarks at issue are placed on the goods by the
trademark owner. Second, the goods and trademarks at issue
are not counterfeit; they are genuine. Third, by definition,
there can be no confusion of source in parallel imports cases,
since the goods emanate from the trademark owner. Fourth,
there is a substantial question as to whether a trademark
owner suffers a loss of profit, cognizable by law, in parallel im-
port transactions since the owner of the trademark has re-
ceived his profit on the first sale of the trademarked goods.
Thus, the primary issue in parallel imports cases is whether a
trademark owner who has placed his trademark on goods man-
ufactured abroad can and should be allowed to prevent these
goods from being imported "independently" into the United
States.
For more than fifty years, Customs Service regulations have
permitted parallel imports to be brought into the United States
under both Section 42 of the Lanham Act and Section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.4 In 1984, three cases challenged the Customs
Service regulations on parallel imports.5 My comments focus
on Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
v. United States (COPIAT), the one case that reached the U.S.
Supreme Court. The other two cases, Olympus and Vivitar,
upheld the Customs Service Regulations. The D.C. Circuit, in
COPIAT, was the only court to hold that the Customs Service
regulations were invalid.
COPIAT's use of the word "American" in its name is some-
what misleading. Most COPIAT members are wholly-owned,
or at least effectively controlled, by the foreign companies
which manufacture the trademarked goods and are largely re-
sponsible for the trademark's goodwill in the United States.'
When the COPIAT case reached the Supreme Court, it took
3. This is confirmed by the legislative history of the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Ch. 15, 98 Stat. 2178. See S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3627, 3629.
4. 1 Fed. Reg. 1,725 (1936) (T.D. 48,537); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1987).
5. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 4ff'd, 792
F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), off'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986), Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cff'd in part, 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988). K Mart intervened in each of these
cases.
6. For example, Cartier, Inc. and Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd., the other two
named plaintiffs, are members of COPIAT and are owned by foreign companies.
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on a different moniker which more clearly contrasts the inter-
ests involved: K Mart Corporation v. Cartier, Inc.7 K Mart is
the second largest retailer and the largest discount retailer in
the world. K Mart and other discounters spend millions each
year to promote merchandise and to keep customers satisfied.
K Mart also owns valuable rights in the K Mart trademark and
other trade names, so it appreciates the protection afforded by
the intellectual property laws.
Some manufacturers, like Cartier, do not want discounters to
handle their products. These manufacturers yearn for a return
to the so-called "Fair Trade" era, when they could legally con-
trol resale prices and boycott discount stores.8 They argue that
the consumer is somehow benefitted when free market forces
are stifled and retail prices are uniformly and artificially
higher.
Discount retailers like K Mart don't share this belief and
neither do I. Lately, however, the intellectual property laws9
- and even the Uniform Commercial Code'0 and common law
- have been the pretext for resale price fixing and other distri-
butional restraints meant to prevent discounting of goods man-
ufactured abroad."
We often lose sight of common sense in the rhetoric of ob-
7. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). The District of Columbia Circuit entered its opinion
and order on May 6, 1986 and denied the appellees' petitions for rehearing and sugges-
tions for rehearing en banc on July 18, 1986. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). By orders
of May 6, 1986 and August 6, 1986, the court of appeals stayed issuance of its mandate
until September 30,1986 in order to give the parties a meaningful opportunity to peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari. The name of the case changed to reflect the fact that K
Mart was the first to file in the Supreme Court. Indeed, K Mart was the only party to
file a petition for certiorari within the time provided by Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure to continue the stay - and preserve the availability of
parallel imports - until final disposition by the Supreme Court.
8. In passing the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89
Stat. 801 (1975), and thereby repealing the so-called Fair Trade laws, Congress re-
jected arguments made by "authorized" dealers that price-fixing was necessary to pro-
tect their goodwill and prevent "free-riding." H.R. REP. No. 341,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1975).
9. For example, "authorized" importers have claimed that, by copyrighting their
labels or trademarks, they can invoke the copyright laws to preclude parallel imports.
Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enterprises, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
10. Parallel imports survived a challenge under the Uniform Commercial Code in
Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. v. DAL International Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100 (3d
Cir. 1986).
11. COPIAT members also argue that once American goods have been exported,
the trademark, tariff or copyright laws prevent their reimportation. See Cosmair, Inc.
v. Dynamite Enterprises, Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
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scure legislative history or the semantics of statutory construc-
tion. In deciding whether or not parallel imports are
excludable under trademark law, we should ask: What makes
sense from a trademark perspective? What makes sense for
the consumer? And what makes sense from the standpoint of
foreign trade?
Looking at each of these questions, I believe you must con-




Section 42 of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simu-
late the name of the [sic] any domestic manufacture, or manu-
facturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located in
any foreign country... or which shall copy or simulate a trade-
mark registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act
... shall-be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United
States .... 12
The Lanham Act is limited to cases where there is a showing
of copying of someone's trademark without their permission,
resulting in confusion of source at the consumer level. Section
526 of the Tariff Act of 193013 makes it unlawful to import any
merchandise of foreign manufacture, if such merchandise bears
a trademark owned by a citizen of the United States, without
the written consent of the owner of such trademark.
14
Section 526 was passed to close a judicially created gap in the
trademark law15 which arose from the decision in A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel.16 In Katzel, the Second Circuit held that a French
company which had sold its trademark rights to an American
corporation could nonetheless continue to sell trademarked
products in the United States, even though it did not have the
permission of the American purchaser of the trademark. 17 The
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1987).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1987).
14. Id.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
16. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), revd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
17. Katzel certainly had nothing to do with multinational enterprises who assign
American trademark rights to wholly owned subsidiaries. It also had nothing to do
with goods manufactured and trademarked abroad with the authority of the Ameri.
can trademark owner.
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that the American corpora-
tion's trademark was infringed. 8
The weight of authority in the courts is that parallel imports
do not violate the trademark laws.'9 This is a sensible conclu-
sion because parallel imports by definition are genuine, and the
trademark has been applied with the consent or under the au-
thority of the domestic trademark owner.2°
The international nature of trademarks is obvious from look-
ing at such familiar examples as Seiko watches, Volkswagen
automobiles, Sony radios and Olympus cameras. These prod-
ucts are manufactured abroad and promoted worldwide, and
consumers universally recognize the trademarks.2 ' Volk-
swagen of America does not urge consumers to buy a Volk-
swagen because it is the American distributor of Volkswagens.
It advertises that Volkswagens are "German engineered"22 (by
its parent company) and strongly hints that they are made in
Germany (by its parent company), even though the cars them-
selves are made in Brazil or Pennsylvania.
It does not make any sense to say that the American consum-
ers associate the Sony trademark with the Sony subsidiary
which distributes Sony products in the United States, or that
identical Sony goods do not bear genuine Sony trademarks.
Nor does it make any sense to say that Sony Corporation of
America has a goodwill separate from that of the foreign par-
ent which directs its operations, advertises worldwide and
manufactures all its merchandise.
18. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
19. See United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated &
remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Monte
Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International (America) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir.
1983); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983);
Diamond Supply Co. v. Prudential Paper Products Co., 589 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), revd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 71
(1987); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
Fla. 1983); United States v. Eighty-Nine Bottles of "Eau de Joy," 797 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1986); American Honda Motor Co. v. Carolina Autosports Leasing & Sales, Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 863 (W.D.N.C. 1986); NEC Electronics, Inc. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d
1506 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987).
20. This is the language of the Customs Service regulation. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21
(1987).
21. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed that American con-
sumers cannot necessarily distinguish between a foreign manufacturer and its affili-
ated domestic distributor with a similar name. In re Wella A.G., 787 F.2d 1549,1552-53
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
22. See advertisement, TiME, Mar. 28, 1988 at 52.
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COPIAT suggests that the American distribution subsidiaries
have promoted the trademark in America, and that trademark
law should protect their investment. The money for this in-
vestment, however, comes from, or is spent at the direction of,
the foreign parent company. The trademark was made famous
worldwide by the foreign parent company, and the goods were
designed and manufactured by the foreign parent company.
II
American Consumers
American consumers express themselves with their dollars.
They spend their money on what they feel gives them the best
value; that is, on the mix of product and service which best fits
their needs.2s Anyone who has saved money by purchasing a
name-brand imported camera, watch, perfume or electronic
item from a discount department store, catalog showroom or
mail-order house, has probably purchased a parallel import. K
Mart, for example, sells parallel imports to the consumer at up
to 40% less than the retail prices which COPIAT members and
other foreign manufacturers seek to maintain in the United
States. 4 Annual retail sales of parallel imports have been esti-
mated at some six billion dollars.2
COPIAT argues that American consumers find parallel im-
ports unsatisfactory, but consumers themselves indicate other-
wise by continuing to purchase parallel imports. However,
COPIAT does not satisfactorily explain why consumers should
shun parallel imports.26 Nor does COPIAT explain why identi-
23. Consumers also speak for themselves. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. filed an
amicus brief in support of petitioner in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. which argued
that consumers benefit greatly from parallel imports and that parallel imports stimu-
late competition in several important ways. Brief of amicus curiae, Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc. at 4, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). The state of
Washington, joined by many other states, likewise argued in an amicus brief that citi-
zens of those states benefitted greatly from parallel imports and would be harmed by
a change in the Customs Service regulations. Brief of amicus curiae, State of Wash-
ington at 2, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. Id In connection with the 1984 Treasury
Department study of -the Customs Service regulations on parallel imports, some
10,000 consumers sent letters supporting the continued availability of parallel im-
ports. 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1984).
24. Parallel imports of wines and spirits save consumers some $20 million annu-
ally, according to states such as Washington which distribute these products them-
selves. Brief of amicus curiae, State of Washington at 7 n.12, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
25. The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTuNE, Jan. 7, 1985, at 89.
26. COPIAT has argued that Section 526 (and Section 42 of the Lanham Act)
1070 [Vol. 10:1065
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cal merchandise is so much more expensive in America than
elsewhere. Why is perfume, a product with no warranty,
cheaper at retail in France than at wholesale in the United
States? Why are Japanese cameras and electronics so much
cheaper in Western Europe than here?
The cost of advertising, providing service or honoring war-
ranties in America does not raise prices.2 European and Japa-
nese markets also require advertising, service and warranties.
In fact, Europe and Japan allow parallel imports, and their
courts have held that the distribution restraints favored by
COPIAT violate their antitrust laws.29
were actually meant to deal with imagined evils ranging from unsafe automobiles to
adulterated liquor. As legislative history and court decisions confirm, these are not
the controlling statutes on these matters. Statutes such as the Federal Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 - 92 (1982), the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391 - 1431 (1982), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 -
7642 (1982 & Supp. 1986), govern the contents and labelling of cosmetics and the
safety and emissions of cars - whether imported or domestic and whether sold by an
"authorized" or an "independent" distributor. Similarly, federal and state warranty,
labeling and consumer protection statutes, such as the Fair Packaging and Labelling
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451 - 61 (1982), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - F.T.C. Im-
provement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 - 12 (1982), govern the responsibility of retailers,
distributors and manufacturers (whether foreign or domestic) for consumer goods.
27. In a submission to the Customs Service, COPIAT stated that the warranty
costs for three of its member camera manufacturers averaged less than 2.7% of the
retail price; three members manufacturing fragrance and cosmetics had no warranty
or service costs whatsoever. COPIAT, The Economic Impact of Diversion, submitted
to the Customs Service, Sep. 20, 1984, at Table 4. One court found that the American
importer of Lladro figurines - a COPIAT member and a very active litigant against
parallel importers - conducted quality control for "smaller pieces" consisting solely
of a spot "shake test" to determine if an occasional box rattled. Weil Ceramics &
Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 711-12 (D.N.J. 1985). See also Diserios Artisticos
& Industriales S.A. v. Work 676 F. Supp. 1254, 1263-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). In this case
the court held that the copyright on Lladro figurines had been forfeited because the
American copyright owner had failed to put a copyright notice on the figurines.
28. There is no legal authority for the position that COPIAT members can ignore
their obligation to honor warranties (which are provided by their parent companies)
on parallel imports.
29. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has ruled that a Swiss
watch manufacturer could not refuse warranty service on watches sold by independ-
ent distributors. E.T.A. Fabriques d'Ebauches v. DK Investment, No. 31/81, European
Court of Justice, Dec. 10, 1985, reported in 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1251, at 262-63 (1986). The European Community Commission recently fined two sub-
sidiaries of Konica (Japan) for engaging in practices to discourage parallel trade in
photographic film. 54 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1350, at 138 (1988).
The Japanese Fair Trade Commission has declared hindering parallel imports to be
an unfair trade practice, and Japanese regulations permit parallel imports. See Taka-
matsu, Parallel Importation qf Trademarked Goods" A Comparative Analysis, 57
WASH. L REv. 433, 442-43 (1982). Japanese courts rejected an attempt by the French
owner of the Lacoste trademark and its Japanese licensee to prevent the sale in Japan
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COPIAT has contended in oral arguments that Mexican Coca
Cola or Puerto Rican baby powder tastes and smells different
to the American consumer. This difference, they argue, ad-
versely affects the value of an internationally recognized trade-
mark in the United States.
The argument is specious e If true, the problem could be
solved by using different packaging for different formulations
of a product. This suggestion is unacceptable to COPIAT. An-
other option is to use different trademarks in different coun-
tries. But COPIAT rejects this solution as well.3'
Instead, COPIAT insists on using the same packaging and
trademarks on foreign products which purportedly are differ-
ent from, and therefore inferior to, those destined for the
American market. Under the Lanham Act, such conduct
causes forfeiture of trademark rights.32
In fact, COPIAT members can solve the "problem" - with-
out changing their packaging or labelling - by selling goods at
a fair price in America. Foreign companies, however, have un-
fairly used Section 526 to preserve artificially high prices in the
American market. They have used it to shut off discounters
from supplies of cameras, watches, consumer electronics and
cosmetics. This issue brings the antitrust laws into play.
COPIAT members, however, have escaped antitrust actions
due to their multinational corporate structure.33
Why should a foreign manufacturer enjoy a degree of control
of Lacoste shirts manufactured for Lacoste's American trademark licensee. La Che-
mise Lacoste v. Shinshinboeki, 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1199, at 225
(1985).
30. This argument was rejected in a case involving Shield deodorant soap and
Sunlight dishwashing detergent allegedly formulated for the British market but pack.
aged identically to the American product. Lever Brothers Co. v. United States, 652 F.
Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1987), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 2461 (1987).
31. Similarly, it does not make sense for COPIAT members to use identical trade-
marks and packaging on goods which are not identical. If, as COPIAT contends, co-
logne is formulated differently for the French consumers than for American, the
labelling should so indicate. As one court noted, a company should not be surprised if
a consumer complains about identically packaged soap which has different formulas
in different countries. See Lever Brom, supra note 30, at 405-06.
32. The conduct must deceive the public. See 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1982).
33. Under Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), a
foreign parent and its domestic subsidiary are a single entity which cannot conspire
with itself to fix prices or allocate markets. Id. at 771. However, a multinational com-
pany cannot both claim to be a single entity in order to avoid antitrust liability under
Copperweld, and at the same time claim to be separate and independent when a con-
sumer seeks warranty service on an "international" warranty or when trademark
good will is at issue.
1072 [Vol. 10:1065
PIRACY AND GRAY MARKETS
over the distribution of its products that no American manufac-
turer can possess?34 An American company which sells goods
at a lower price in one market than another cannot invoke the
trademark law or Section 526 to prevent natural operation of
free market forces. An American company cannot call on the
government to enforce its distributional restraints or price dis-
crimination. Such actions are precisely what foreign manufac-
turers, through COPIAT, claim under Section 526.
The same corporations which insist that resale price mainte-
nance is good for consumers now state that parallel imports are
bad for consumers. They believe that discounting is bad, argu-
ing that not only should the consumer pay higher prices, but
also the manufacturer should dictate the price consumers must
pay. This runs counter to decades of judicial and congressional
wisdom developed in the antitrust laws.3
III
Foreign Trade
Our foreign trade deficits6 is unprecedented, and it is only
worsened when American consumers are forced to pay extra
for foreign goods. The Reagan Administration has repeatedly
sought to lower non-tariff barriers to trade, eliminate protec-
tionism and "level" the international "playing field." '37 None of
these goals will be achieved by barring parallel imports. A ban
on parallel imports would be a significant trade barrier. To
close the American market to foreign merchandise from genu-
ine manufacturers would constitute the worst sort of protec-
34. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Ch. 15, 98 Stat.
4173.
35. Historically, courts have been quick to strike down arrangements where a
trademark has been used to divide territories, whether national or international. See,
e-g., U.S. v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S.
593 (1951). Group boycotts to enforce price fixing are per se illegal regardless of the
euphemistic label which the participants have concocted. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). Any joint arrangement designed to prevent
discounters from obtaining merchandise is per se illegal. U.S. v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966). Moreover, the trademark laws do not allow a trade-
mark owner to control the resale prices of goods it has sold. Susser v. Carvel Corp.,
332 F.2d 505, 513 (2d Cir. 1964), cert dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Sunbeam Corp. v.
Wentling, 192 F.2d 7, 9 (3d Cir. 1951).
36. WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1988, at 30, col. 3; Mar. 16, 1988, at 4, col. 3; Apr. 15, 1988,
at 1, col. 6.
37. Bock, The Making of Mishmash, TIME, Mar. 28, 1988 at 48.
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tionism. Since our trading partners allow parallel imports, the
playing field is already level.
Conclusion
As this article is being written, the Supreme Court has not
reached a decision in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.3' One can
only hope that common sense will ultimately prevail in the
Supreme Court, as it did in the district courts in Vivitar, Olym-
pus and COPIAT, and in the courts of appeals in deciding Viv-
itar and Olympus.3 9 The Court should see that the foreign
trade deficit, American consumer preferences, and a fair read-
ing of the body of trademark law all support continuing to al-
low parallel imports.
38. Ed. Note - The case was decided on the merits on May 31, 1988. 108 S. Ct.
1811 (1988)
39. In fact, both sides have championed legislative solutions to the issue. Senator
Chafee (R - RI.) introduced legislation to codify the Customs Service regulations.
Price Competitive Products Act of 1987, S. 1097, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Senator
Hatch (R - Utah) introduced a bill to amend the Lanham Act to repudiate Customs
Service regulations. Trademark Protection Act of 1986, S. 1671, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987). As recently as 1986, Congress rejected a proposal which would have effec-
tively banned parallel imports of wines and spirits as a "price-fixing bill" that would
"establish a monopoly, plain and simple." 132 CoNG. REC. H11,083-85 (daily ed. Oct. 15,
1986) (statement of Rep. Gray).
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